Harmon-Jones, Eddie (2017) Clarifying concepts in cognitive dissonance theory.
Animal Sentience 12(5)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1199

Date of submission: 2017-04-05
Date of acceptance: 2017-04-18

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2017.009: Harmon-Jones on Zentall on Cognitive Dissonance

Clarifying concepts in cognitive dissonance theory
Commentary on Zentall on Cognitive Dissonance

Eddie Harmon-Jones
The University of New South Wales
Abstract: This commentary on Zentall’s target article focuses primarily on clarifying some
postulates and variables in cognitive dissonance theory. I discuss the adaptive motivational
functions of dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction, and attempt to clarify some past
dissonance experiments and to tease apart a dissonance theory and contrast explanation of
effort-justification-type effects. The evidence and arguments reviewed here support the
explanatory power of cognitive dissonance theory in a wide variety of circumstances in
human and nonhuman animals, but they depend on first defining concepts such as
“cognitions” quite broadly, as Festinger did when he originally proposed the theory.
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In a very thought-provoking target article, Zentall (2016) reviews the results of several clever
experiments that are consistent with effort-justification effects obtained from research on
cognitive dissonance theory. However, Zentall presents the case that the results may be
better explained by a contrast effect. He also reviews several exciting new results from
experiments suggesting that the anticipation of unpleasant effort could cause increased
reward valuation. The target article also includes a very interesting discussion on “out of
sight, out of mind” that has not been fully investigated in humans by dissonance
researchers. I suspect that this target article will inspire much new research.
In this commentary, I will offer a few observations on Zentall’s target article. I will
focus primarily on clarifying some postulates and variables in cognitive dissonance theory,
and will then discuss the adaptive motivational functions of dissonance arousal and
dissonance reduction. I will also discuss dissonance processes in nonhuman animals and
attempt to clarify some past dissonance experiments. I will finish by discussing how one
might tease apart a dissonance theory and contrast explanation of effort-justification-type
effects.
Clarifications of Postulates and Variables in Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Cognitive dissonance theory is concerned with relationships between cognitions. The term
“cognitions” is defined broadly to include almost any knowledge about oneself or the
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environment (Festinger, 1957, pp. 9-11). The theory did not propose that "conflict between
beliefs" was "the primary responsible mechanism" [Zentall, Introduction, para. 2].
Moreover, the dissonance-theoretic explanation of the effort-justification paradigm is not
consistent with the statement by Zentall that "pigeons experienced conflict between their
beliefs (the law of least effort) and their behavior (they worked harder on some trials than
on others to obtain the same reward)" [The Within-Trial Contrast Effect, para. 4].
Mills (Aronson & Mills, 1959), who conducted the first effort-justification
experiment, explained quite precisely why effort should evoke dissonance. He wrote:
“Dissonance is aroused whenever a person engages in an unpleasant activity to
obtain some desirable outcome. From the cognition that the activity is unpleasant, it
follows that one would not engage in the activity; the cognition that the activity is
unpleasant is dissonant with engaging in the activity. Dissonance should be greater,
the greater the unpleasant effort required to obtain the outcome.” (Harmon-Jones &
Mills, 1999, p. 7)
The conflict is between the knowledge that the activity is unpleasant and the knowledge
that one has engaged in that activity. Hence any unpleasant features of the behavior should
evoke dissonance and explain the results accounted for by contrast. Another key part of
Mills’s (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) explanation is the idea that the effort is “required to
obtain the outcome” (p. 7), a point to which I return later in this commentary.
The Motivational Functions of Dissonance Arousal and Dissonance Reduction
Zentall writes, “Although the resolution of cognitive dissonance may make us feel better, it
can be detrimental to our health and can in many cases encourage us to behave
inappropriately” [Introduction, para. 1]. Festinger (1957) did not discuss whether
dissonance and its reduction were associated with negative or positive consequences.
However, other dissonance theorists have concurred with Zentall and speculated that
dissonance processes were primarily associated with negative consequences and were
maladaptive (Aronson, 1995).
In contrast, according to the action-based version of dissonance (Harmon-Jones,
1999; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, &
Levy, 2015), dissonance processes may serve adaptive functions (although of course,
adaptive mechanisms may occasionally cause harm as well). The model begins by positing
that cognition is for action; that is, one of the most important functions of cognition is to
guide behavior. Inconsistent information (cognitions) causes dissonance because it has the
potential to interfere with action. The affective state of dissonance signals that there is a
conflict between action tendencies and that the “cognitive inconsistency” needs to be
addressed, so that behavior can occur. My colleagues and I have conducted a number of
experiments testing hypotheses derived from this model (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, &
Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones,
Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Serra, & Gable, 2011;
Harmon-Jones, Peterson, & Vaughn, 2003; Harmon-Jones, Price, & Harmon-Jones, 2015;
Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2011).
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Dissonance Processes in Nonhuman Animals and Clarifying Past Dissonance Experiments
Zentall’s research suggests that something like dissonance processes may occur in
nonhuman animals. Similarly, Lawrence and Festinger (1962) reported 16 experiments
providing evidence suggestive of dissonance reduction in laboratory rats. More recent
experiments have revealed that dissonance reduction may occur in capuchin monkeys
(Egan, Santos, & Blooom, 2007). Zentall discusses the latter research and then dismisses it
based on the critical work by Chen and Risen (2010).
Egan, Bloom, and Santos (2010) have since addressed the criticisms of Chen and
Risen (2010) by using a “blind choice” paradigm. They found spreading of alternatives after
their subjects (capuchin monkeys or preschool children) made a choice between two hidden
objects. Thus, the attitude change could not be explained by “revealed preferences.”
Several other studies have also addressed these earlier criticisms (see review by Kitayama,
Tompson, & Chua, 2014).
Zentall also provides a “contrast” reinterpretation of the classic experiment by
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In that experiment, participants were paid $1 or $20 to tell a
subsequent “participant” that the boring task they had just completed was in fact
interesting. From dissonance theory, the dollars paid represented the number of cognitions
consonant with engaging in the counter-attitudinal behavior (i.e., telling the next participant
that the task was interesting). Most conceptual replications of this experiment
operationalized the number of consonant cognitions with a manipulation of perceived
choice: Participants who were led to believe that they were freely choosing to engage in
counter-attitudinal behavior changed their attitudes to make them more consistent with the
behavior than did participants who were led to believe they were “forced” to engage in the
same behavior (i.e., having been repeatedly told that they were randomly assigned to make
the counter-attitudinal statement). These experiments assumed that perceiving oneself as
having freely chosen to engage in counter-attitudinal behavior would provide fewer
cognitions consonant with the behavior than perceiving oneself as having been forced by
the researcher to engage in the same behavior. It is not clear how a contrast explanation
would handle these perceived choice experiments, which form the bulk of research on
dissonance theory.
Teasing Apart the Dissonance and Contrast Explanations of Effort Justification
The difference between the two conceptual explanations – cognitive dissonance reduction
versus contrast effect – could be teased apart by manipulating whether there is an
association between the unpleasant effort and the reward. A contrast explanation would
seem to predict that the association would not matter, whereas a dissonance explanation
would seem to predict that the association would matter (see the earlier quotation from
Mills). That is, according to dissonance theory, the reward should be associated with the
unpleasant effort in order to "justify" the effort. If the reward is merely presented closely in
time/space to the unpleasant effort and is explicitly described as not being associated with
the effort, then increased reward valuation would not be predicted by dissonance theory
but would be predicted by a contrast-effect perspective. It may be the case that nonhuman
animals often and adult humans occasionally assume implicitly that the reward is associated
with the effort. Consequently, it may be difficult to test this idea in nonhuman animals if
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they often/always assume that the reward is linked to their own effort. With adult humans,
a researcher can explicitly inform them that the reward is not linked to the effort and can
thus test these competing predictions.
Research by Gerard and Mathewson (1966) has already provided one of these tests,
and it has supported a dissonance-theoretic explanation over a contrast explanation. In this
experiment, participants received electric shocks in order to be initiated into a group
(initiates condition) or they received electric shocks as part of a study (non-initiate
condition). Within each of these conditions, half the participants received intense shocks
and half received mild shocks. This experiment used the amount of suffering of physical pain
as the manipulation of the intensity of unpleasant effort. After participants received the
shocks, they heard and then rated a boring group discussion. Participants in the “initiates”
condition were led to believe that this was a recording of a previous meeting of the group
that they were about to join, whereas participants in the “non-initiates” condition simply
evaluated the group. Participants who experienced the intense (effortful) shocks evaluated
the group more positively than participants who experienced the mild shocks. However, this
effort-justification effect occurred only when participants were led to believe that they were
receiving the shocks in order to gain access to the group (gain a reward). When participants
believed they were receiving the shocks as part of a psychological experiment (the noninitiate condition), those who received the intense shocks evaluated the group more
negatively than those who received the mild shocks. Thus, the typical effect of shock
intensity on the evaluation of the group (i.e., the effort-justification effect) was reversed
when participants believed their effort did not lead to admission into the group (the
reward), a result that is the opposite of what would be predicted by a contrast effect.
Another line of inquiry, however, predicts a relationship between effort and reward
valuation opposite to the one suggested by both dissonance theory and the contrast effect:
Theories of decision making (see Kivetz, 2003; Walton, Kennerley, Bannerman, Phillips, &
Rushworth, 2006) and social theories of equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978)
suggest that greater effort should lead to reward devaluation. These theories view effort as
a negative value or as a cost. A reward is perceived as less valuable if it is difficult to obtain
than if it is easy to obtain because its benefits are offset by its costs. This principle has been
referred to as effort discounting.
In an experiment by Botvinick et al. (2009) two types of task-switching blocks
(counterbalanced) were presented to participants: low versus high effort. After each block,
participants were shown a screen that indicated whether or not they had earned a dollar ($
or X), and neural activity in response to this indicator was measured. High-effort blocks with
(dollar) rewards caused the least nucleus accumbens activity, which was interpreted to
indicate low-reward valuation. Participants had been explicitly informed that the amount
they would earn would be equal for high- and low-effort blocks, and would not depend on
their speed or accuracy. This methodology differs from dissonance experiments on the
effects of effort justification, which do not inform participants that the reward is equal in
high- versus low-effort conditions.
Why would these different sets of theories and bodies of research lead to opposite
predictions and results? I believe the unrecognized difference between these two
perspectives is that the experimental designs used for the two perspectives differ in terms
of perceived psychological control over obtaining the reward. That is, in dissonance and
Zentall’s contrast experiments, individuals perceive an association between their effort and
receiving the reward, whereas in the effort-discounting studies (and in Gerard and
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Mathewson’s contrast conditions), individuals do not (in fact they are explicitly informed
that there is no association between their effort and receiving the reward). The belief that
unpleasant effort was necessary to obtain the reward may be an important factor in
producing effort justification rather than effort discounting.
The contrast perspective suggests that undergoing any unpleasant experience will
make subsequent experiences (rewards) more positive by comparison. Dissonance theory,
however, would counter that individuals are only motivated to perceive a subsequent
experience more positively when the subsequent event is causally connected to the
unpleasant effort. That is, effort justification only occurs when individuals believe they have
exerted the effort in order to obtain the reward.
The results of the experiment by Gerard and Mathewson (1966) were inconsistent
with a contrast effect interpretation but consistent with cognitive dissonance theory. When
participants underwent shocks and were informed that these were unrelated to
subsequently being allowed to join a group, they evaluated the group more negatively (not
more positively as a contrast effect would predict). These findings, taken together with the
results obtained on effort discounting, suggest that cognitive dissonance theory is a better
explanation of responses to unpleasant effort than a contrast explanation. An association
between effort and reward may often be assumed in nonhuman animals and in humans. (“I
worked hard and I am receiving this reward as a result of my work.”) However, when that
association is explicitly and heavy-handedly broken by a researcher, individuals seem to
devalue the reward, as Gerard and Mathewson (1966) and effort-discounting experiments
have shown.
Conclusion
Taken together, the evidence and arguments reviewed here support the explanatory power
of cognitive dissonance theory in a wide variety of circumstances, in both human and
nonhuman animals. However, this requires us to define concepts such as “cognitions” quite
broadly, as Festinger did when he originally proposed the theory.
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